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Abstract
Despite an erosion of consensus on its benefits, capital account convertibility remains a long-term goal of China. This 
paper identifies three major preconditions for convertibility in China: a strong domestic banking system, relatively 
developed domestic financial markets, and an equilibrium exchange rate. The authors examine each of these in turn and 
find that, in significant respects, China does not yet meet any of the conditions necessary for convertibility. They then 
evaluate China’s progress to date on capital account liberalization, including recent efforts to promote renminbi inter-
nationalization and greater use of the renminbi in trade settlement. The paper concludes with an overview of remaining 
obstacles to convertibility and policy recommendations.
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For many years, the conventional wisdom among economists was that capital account convertibility 
provides countries unambiguous economic benefits via both improved capital allocation and increased 
opportunities to smooth consumption via international borrowing. This wisdom, it turned out, was 
based primarily on an a priori argument rather than supported strongly by empirics. Some attempts to 
demonstrate a linkage between international financial integration via capital account convertibility, on the 
one hand, and economic growth, on the other, have been disappointing at best (Eichengreen 2001; Prasad 
and Rajan 2008). Moreover, substantial evidence has accumulated that under some circumstances the 
introduction of capital account convertibility can precipitate financial crises. Finally, in some cases, such 
as during the Asian Financial crisis of the late 1990s, countries that had retained strong capital controls 
came through crises better than those that had liberalized earlier. More generally, across a large number of 
crisis episodes countries with capital controls in place prior to the outbreak of a crisis suffered significantly 
lower drops in real economic output than countries without such controls.
Despite the erosion of consensus on its economic benefits, capital account convertibility remains 
a long-term goal for China. The goal of “gradually realizing convertibility of the capital account” 
is explicit in the Twelfth Five-Year Program, which was approved by the Central Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party on October 18, 2010.1 Earlier the goal of capital account convertibility was 
implicit in the State Council’s objective of making Shanghai an international financial center by 2020.2 
And it is consistent with China’s campaign to increase the international use of the Chinese currency, 
discussed further below. Moreover, several high government officials have endorsed capital account 
convertibility. Yi Gang, Vice-Governor of the People’s Bank of China and concurrently the director 
of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, in an interview with Caixin in the summer of 2010 
stated that “a convertible yuan remains the ultimate goal for the nation’s currency exchange rate reform.”3 
Vice-Governor Yi noted that most countries achieve capital account convertibility within 7 to 10 years 
after making their currencies convertible for current account transactions. China achieved the latter 
in December 1996, but Yi explained that China’s longer than usual transition was due to its size and 
unbalanced development.
Preconditions for cAPitAl Account convertibility
Broadly speaking there are three important preconditions for moving to capital account liberalization: 
a strong domestic banking system, relatively developed domestic financial markets, and an equilibrium 
exchange rate. We examine each of these in turn.3
strength of the domestic banking system 
The first precondition for capital account convertibility is a strong domestic banking system. When 
capital controls are relaxed typically domestic residents (or financial institutions holding funds on behalf 
of domestic residents) diversify the currency composition of their assets, leading to an outflow of funds 
from the domestic banking system. When a country’s banking system is perceived as weak, opening the 
capital account can accelerate these outflows as depositors move funds to the presumed relative safety 
of foreign banks. If sufficiently large, these outflows, in turn, can lead to a sharp decline in the value of 
the domestic currency. If there are currency mismatches under these conditions, firms and individuals 
with foreign-currency denominated debts but income denominated only or largely in domestic-currency 
will experience a sharp increase in the burden of servicing their loans, potentially leading to a broad 
financial crisis. This concern is particularly salient in China where bank deposits by year-end 2009 
reached RMB61.2 trillion (US$8.96 trillion),4 an extraordinary 183 percent of GDP (People’s Bank of 
China, Monetary Analysis Small Group 2010, 1).5 More than 90 percent of these deposits are controlled 
by households and non-financial corporations. These deposits are most likely to migrate out of Chinese 
banks in anticipation of or in the early stages of a crisis.
China’s banks now appear to be enormously stronger than they were in the mid-1990s when the 
largest financial institutions were insolvent, leading ultimately to massive government injections of capital 
and a write off of the non-performing loans that had accumulated in the banking system over many years 
(Lardy 1998, 5; Ma Guonan 2006). Following these write-offs, the authorities engineered reforms in the 
governance of China’s largest banks, further injections of capital by foreign strategic investors, and public 
listings of bank shares on the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock markets. 
The financial transformation of the banking system that resulted is reflected in three key indicators. 
First, total non-performing loans of China’s major commercial banks came down sharply from RMB2, 
104 billion (US$254 billion) and 18 percent of loans outstanding at year-end 2003 to only RMB426 
billion (US$62 billion) and 1.6 percent of loans outstanding by year-end 2009. Second, in 2003 only 8 
domestic banks accounting for a mere 0.6 percent of total banking assets met China’s minimum capital 
adequacy requirement, which then was 8 percent. This rose to 239 banks accounting for 100 percent of 
total banking assets by the end of 2009, when the risk-weighted average capital adequacy ratio of China’s 
banking industry was significantly higher at 11.4 percent. Third, in 2009 after-tax profits of the banking 
industry as a whole were RMB670 billion (US$98 billion), with the return on average equity at 16.2 
percent and return on average total assets at 0.9 percent (China Banking Regulatory Commission 2009, 
30-32, 127). These numbers on returns compare extremely favorably with well-regarded international 
banks such as HSBC and Standard Chartered. 64
A number of questions could be raised as to whether these data truly reflect strong Chinese bank 
performance. Are bank capital adequacy ratios overstated by allowing dubious assets to be included in 
bank capital or by dodgy risk weighting? Probably not significantly. Regarding bank capital, for example, 
the regulator, the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), allowed banks to issue subordinated 
debt and count it as part of their tier-two capital starting in 2004. During the global financial and 
economic crisis, when bank lending in China soared, Chinese banks maintained their capital adequacy 
ratios by sharply stepping up their issuance of subordinated debt. But it eventuated that the banks were 
merely selling much of this debt to each other.7 The regulator, recognizing that these cross-holdings of 
subordinated debt did nothing to increase capital in the banking system as a whole, ruled in a matter of 
months that subordinated debt held by other banks could not be counted as part of a bank’s  
capital.8  Instead, in 2010 the CBRC compelled China’s four major banks to raise RMB 264.4 billion 
(US$39.1 billion) in new capital via rights issues and the sale of convertible bonds.9 With regard to risk 
weighting of assets, the CBRC eliminated more than a decade ago such dodgy procedures as allowing 
banks to hold little or no capital against loans made to state-owned companies. 
Are profits overstated because of lax loan classification standards and weak provisioning 
requirements? Again, probably not significantly. The CBRC modeled China’s loan classification scheme 
on international standards and has imposed tough provisioning requirements. By year-end 2009 
loan-loss provisions set aside by commercial banks stood at RMB663 billion (US$97 billion), putting 
the provisioning ratio at 155 percent, up dramatically from only 20 percent in 2003 (China Banking 
Regulatory Commission 2010, 131). 
Thus weak prudential and regulatory standards are not likely to result in a major over-statement of 
Chinese bank earnings.
The more relevant question is to what extent is bank income inflated by the central bank’s control 
of interest rates? The People’s Bank of China has controlled the interest rate structure for both deposits 
and loans of commercial banks for many years. Partial liberalization, which took the form of allowing 
increasing upward flexibility from benchmark lending rates began as early as 1997 when banks were 
allowed to adjust lending rates upward from benchmark rates by as much as 20 percent. This process 
culminated in the fall of 2004 when the central bank eliminated the ceiling on lending rates.10 But the 
authorities have not subsequently increased the flexibility around the benchmark lending and deposit 
rates. Notably benchmark deposit rates set by the central bank remain a hard constraint on the up 
side. This protracted stall in interest rate reform seems somewhat surprising given Premier Wen Jiabao’s 
statement at the National People’s Congress in the spring of 2009 that China “will carry forward market-
based reform of interest rates.”11 5
The potential flattering effect of central bank control of the interest rate structure on bank earnings 
arises because the central bank sets a floor on bank lending rates but a ceiling on bank deposit rates. Thus 
the central bank directly controls the spreads that banks earn on their deposit taking and lending activities. 
Measuring the effect of the central bank’s control of interest rates has been a key issue in the assessment 
of Chinese bank performance by outside analysts for many years. The magnitude of the impact of central 
bank control of interest rate on bank earnings was acknowledged by Xiao Gang, the Chairman of the 
Bank of China (China’s 4th largest bank by assets). In a posting on the bank’s web site he acknowledged 
that because of the central bank’s control of interest rates the net interest margins Chinese banks earn on 
their renminbi loans are almost double what they would earn in a liberalized interest rate environment.12 
If Xiao Gang’s estimate that interest rate liberalization would cut the net interest margins of Chinese 
banks by as much as half is correct, what would this mean for Chinese bank earnings? Clearly net interest 
income would fall by almost half. Since net interest income accounted for 63 percent of the profits of 
banking institutions in 2009, central bank control of the interest rate structure could be said to result 
in an inflation of bank profits by as much as 45 percent (China Banking Regulatory Commission 2010, 
32). Similarly, interest rate liberalization would reduce reported return on equity and return on assets by 
the same proportion.  In short, interest rate liberalization would reduce bank earnings substantially and 
Chinese bank performance would look much weaker in comparison with international peers. 
The central bank’s control of the structure of interest rates results in financial repression that imposes 
a heavy implicit tax, particularly on the household sector (Lardy 2008). In China’s banking system 
at year-end 2009 the non-financial corporate sector was a slightly larger source of deposits than were 
households. But the non-financial corporate sector was actually a net borrower. Households supplied 
slightly less deposits than corporates, but households were a large net depositor since total household 
borrowing at year-end 2009 was less than a third of household deposits. In 2009-2010 banks paid only 
0.36 percent on demand deposits and rates ranging 
from 1.71 percent on three- month time deposits 
to as much as 3.60 percent on five-year time 
deposits.13 The average cost of household deposits 
in 2009 was 1.94 percent, 1.78 percent, and  
1.52 percent at the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, 
and China Merchants Bank, respectively. But, as 
reflected in Table 1, at the same banks the average 
yield on loans to households was 4.93 percent,  
5.37 percent, and 5.07 percent, respectively. 





1. The yield on the average annual balance of interest-generating assets 
less the cost of the average annual balance of interest-bearing liabilities.
2. The average percent yield on personal loans less the average cost of 
household deposits.
Sources: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd., 2009 Annual 
Results Announcement, pp. 4, 14, 16. China Construction Bank 
Corporation, Annual Report 2009, pp. 23, 25–26. China Merchants Bank 
Co. Ltd., Annual Report 2009, pp. 26–28.6
These numbers mean that these banks achieved spreads on lending to households that exceeded 
the net interest spread these banks enjoyed on their entire range of assets and liabilities by approximately 
two-fifths to two-thirds. This differential arose for two reasons. First, these banks held other assets that 
earned much less than their earnings on lending to households. For example, they earned only  
1.6 percent on required reserves placed at the central bank and only slightly more on their large holdings 
of bonds issued by the central bank to sterilize increases in the domestic money supply resulting from its 
intervention in foreign exchange markets.14 And second, banks had to pay substantially higher interest 
rates on some of their liabilities than they paid on household deposits. For example, in 2009 the China 
Construction Bank paid 3.81 percent interest on the bonds it issued, more than twice what it paid on 
household deposits.
To summarize, Chinese banks are highly dependent on their business with households for two 
reasons. First, the net interest spreads on this business are much higher than the net spreads that banks 
achieve on their other activities. And second, households are the dominant source of bank funding. If 
China liberalized the capital account under these conditions, the banks might be compelled to raise 
deposit rates to prevent large outflows of deposits, particularly from the household sector. This could have 
a highly adverse effect on bank earnings. According to our calculations, an increase in the average deposit 
rate of only 110 basis points in 2009 would have eliminated all bank profits.
Thus interest rate liberalization is an important precondition for capital account liberalization 
for two reasons. First, as the above analysis suggests, it is essential to gradually reduce and finally 
eliminate financial repression prior to liberalizing the capital account. Otherwise depositors, particularly 
households, may shift their funds out of the domestic banking system, potentially creating a liquidity 
crisis for the banking system.
Second, in the long-run interest rate liberalization is essential to the strengthening of China’s 
banking system.  As long as banks operate in a highly cosseted interest rate environment, competition 
in the banking system will remain limited and banks will have insufficient ability and incentive to price 
risk appropriately and operate on a commercial basis. Thus the allocation of funds by the banking would 
remain less efficient than would be the case if banks operated in a liberalized interest rate environment.
level of development of the financial system
A second prerequisite for the liberalization of the capital account is a well-developed capital market. There 
are at least two reasons for this. First, capital markets can provide an additional source of funding for 
the corporate sector thereby providing more competition for domestic banks and hastening the banks’ 
transition to operation on a fully commercial basis. Second, deeper local debt markets make it easier for a 
country to ease restrictions on capital flows because deep markets make it easier to to absorb large capital 7
inflows without creating asset bubbles in local markets. Finally, if local capital markets are underdeveloped 
when capital restrictions are eased domestic firms may borrow funds abroad, creating the possibility of 
currency and maturity mismatches.
While China has a significant market for government bonds, the local market in corporate debt is 
not well developed. The magnitude of funds raised through the corporate debt market is small, especially 
when measured against the funding provided to the corporate sector through the banking system. 
Moreover, issuance is dominated by a handful of large state-owned institutions, notably the Ministry 
of Railroads and the major banks. At the end of 2007 the total value of non-financial corporate bonds 
outstanding was only RMB768.3 billion (US$105.2 billion) (Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission 
2008, 6-9).15 That was only 3 percent of the RMB22.7 trillion (US$3.11 trillion) outstanding in bank 
loans to non-financial corporations and also less than 3 percent of 2007 GDP. By year-end  
2009 non-financial corporate bonds outstanding grew by about two-fifths to reach RMB1,097 billion 
(US$161 billion) (Asian Bond Monitor 2010, 46). But bank loans outstanding to non-financial 
corporations had expanded even more rapidly to reach RMB34.4 trillion (US$5.0 trillion) so 
non-financial corporations were even more dependent on bank loans for their financing than they had 
been in 2007. 
In contrast with the corporate bond market, the foreign exchange forward and swap transactions 
markets have developed rapidly in recent years. An over the counter forward market emerged as early as 
1997. But with a fixed exchange rate vis a vis the dollar and the vast majority of foreign trade transactions 
denominated and settled in dollars, the volume of transactions was modest. However, following depegging 
of the renminbi to the dollar in mid-2005, China launched an interbank foreign exchange forward 
market and in the following year formally introduced foreign exchange swap transactions. These markets 
allowed Chinese exporters and importers to hedge the foreign exchange risk inherent in an environment 
of increased renminbi volatility. Volume in these two markets combined grew rapidly, reaching $460 
billion by 2008 and almost doubled in 2009, reaching $810 billion (People’s Bank of China Monetary 
Analysis Small Group 2010, 26).
flexibility of the exchange rate
A third precondition for a successful transition to capital account convertibility is an exchange rate that 
is reasonably close to its underlying equilibrium level. A move to capital account convertibility when 
an exchange rate is substantially under- (over-) valued will precipitate capital in (out) flows that can be 
destabilizing. The preponderance of evidence suggests that the renminbi is significantly undervalued. A 
survey of 18 studies of the Chinese exchange rate found that: all but one concluded that the renminbi 
was undervalued; the average estimate of the needed appreciation in the real effective exchange rate was 8
19 percent; and that the needed appreciation of the real exchange rate was higher for those studies based 
on data from the period 2005-2007 than studies based on data from the period 2000-2004 (Cline and 
Williamson 2008, 131-132). More recently Cline and Williamson pegged the renminbi undervaluation 
at 21 percent and 14 percent (both on a real effective basis) in 2009 and 2010, respectively (Cline and 
Williamson 2009; Cline and Williamson 2010).
In addition to these direct estimates of the degree of undervaluation, Chinese government 
intervention in the foreign exchange market to prevent the renminbi from appreciating also clearly 
suggests that the renminbi is undervalued.  This intervention has led to a buildup of official foreign 
exchange reserves, from $412 billion at year-end 2003 to $2,850 billion at the end of 2010, that is 
unprecedented in global history. The vast bulk of this build up is attributable to China’s surpluses on 
current account rather than to surpluses on the capital and financial account as a result of net inflows of 
foreign direct investment, portfolio capital, and so forth.16  The magnitude of the official intervention in 
the foreign exchange market is so large that it strongly suggests that the government has made little or 
no progress in making the value of the exchange rate based more on “market supply and demand,” a goal 
enunciated in July 2005.17 Equally unprecedented in the history of the international monetary system 
is the large-scale open market operations that the central bank has undertaken to partially sterilize the 
domestic monetary expansion caused by foreign exchange intervention (Cappiello and Ferrucci 2008, 
16-17). This, in turn, has prevented real appreciation of the renminbi via the price mechanism.
Progress to dAte on cAPitAl Account liberAlizAtion
While China achieved full current account convertibility in late 1996, its progress on capital account 
convertibility has proceeded slowly and in discrete stages. In December 1993, China’s authorities publicly 
stated that, “The long-term goal of China’s foreign exchange reforms is to realize the convertibility of the 
renminbi. In order to reach this goal, we must move gradually and in the proper sequence of events” (Hu 
Xiaolian 2009) In effect this has meant achieving convertibility on current account transactions before 
capital account transactions and loosening restrictions on capital inflows before loosening restrictions on 
capital outflows. 
In the decade following China’s reform and opening, the government showed a new willingness 
to use foreign capital to fund domestic investment. The majority of this capital came in the form of 
foreign loans from international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, and foreign 
governments. China’s objective was to attract long-term stable forms of investment and take advantage of 
favorable lending rates abroad. These loan inflows marked a major policy shift but remained modest in 
size, reaching a peak of just 1.68 percent of GDP in 1990. 9
China took more significant steps toward liberalization when it loosened constraints on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) beginning in the early 1990s. These liberalization policies included: 1) shifting 
decision-making power regarding the screening and approval of FDI from the central government toward 
local governments; 2) relaxing ownership restrictions away from joint-venture requirements and allowing 
a greater proportion of FDI to come from wholly-owned foreign enterprises; 3) increasing managerial 
autonomy relating to pricing and financial decisions; 4) offering concessions on customs duties, income 
taxes, and taxes on profit remittances; and 5) relaxing sectoral controls and opening up the services sector, 
including the banking, retailing and telecommunications industries. 
Inward FDI in manufacturing is now almost completely liberalized in China with the exception 
of restrictions in some “strategic” sectors and, in some cases, limits on the extent and form of foreign 
ownership. There are more restrictions on FDI in China’s service sector, particularly telecommunications 
and financial services including banking, insurance, and securities. Foreign companies are permitted to 
make withdrawals from their foreign exchange accounts and convert local currency to make external 
current account payments of profits and dividends so long as the payments are consistent with their 
business scope, and, in the case of joint venture companies, approved by the firm’s board of directors. 
China’s relatively accommodative stance has made it the world’s second largest destination for FDI.
China’s recent measures to further liberalize FDI in response to the global economic crisis reflect the 
major role that FDI has played in driving economic growth over the past thirty years. When FDI inflows 
reached their peak in 2008, foreign invested enterprises made up just 3 percent of total enterprises, yet 
contributed to 30 percent of China’s total industrial output value, 21 percent of total tax revenues, and  
55 percent of total exports.18 This trend reversed due to the global financial crisis when FDI growth fell 
from 20 percent in 2008 to negative 13 percent in 2009, the first time that FDI growth had turned 
negative in a decade. 
To stabilize and expand FDI inflows, in July 2009 the Ministry of Commerce submitted a 42-point 
proposal to the State Council containing a number of policy recommendations, including measures to 
further delegate FDI examination and approval rights and to relax the examination and approval process 
for individual foreign investments. Of particular significance was a proposal to simplify and moderately 
relax the foreign exchange registrations procedures imposed on foreign investors who invest in Chinese 
real estate enterprises, thereby easing the so-called “foreign capital restraining order.”19 There were also 
proposals to adjust the catalogue of permitted uses for foreign investment and give local governments 
more latitude to use preferential policies to attract foreign capital. 
The Chinese government initially focused on designing policies to attract inbound foreign 
investment and gave little attention to promoting outbound FDI (OFDI). More recently, however, the 
authorities have begun to view OFDI as a valuable way to secure commodities needed for growth and 10
further integrate China into the global trading system. The demand for foreign exchange associated with 
ODFI could slow the pace of accumulation of official holdings of foreign exchange and also provide a way 
for China to diversify its foreign investments away from U.S. Treasuries. 
This more favorable stance toward OFDI emerged clearly in 1999 when the government announced 
the breakthrough “Go Global” policy with the primary goal making it easier for domestic firms to secure 
commodities abroad.  Over the past decade, government agencies relaxed restrictions on ODFI and 
actively supported firms going abroad through subsidies, tax breaks, and improved access to financing. 
For example, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) gradually eased approval procedures over time by 
delegating greater responsibility to local agencies. In May 2009, it introduced new project approval rules 
to reduce approval time, lift value thresholds, and increase the authority of local MOFCOM branches. 
Similarly, the CBRC issued guidelines in December 2008 allowing commercial banks to provide loans to 
firms for use in cross-border M&A. 
In addition, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) has provided domestic firms with 
easier access to foreign exchange by relaxing capital controls over time and has provided firms investing 
with more opportunities to raise capital. SAFE draft regulations, published in May 2009, allow domestic 
firms to register the source of their foreign exchange financing after their investment overseas rather than 
requiring approval in advance.20 These new rules also permit firms to raise capital from more sources, 
including domestic foreign exchange loans, foreign exchange purchased with renminbi, foreign currency 
funds already possessed by the firm, and retained profits from overseas.
Yet, China’s investment outflows are dwarfed by FDI inflows and its ODFI remains low by most 
measures.21 In 2009, China’s share of global ODFI flows was 4 percent and by year-end its share of the 
stock was 1.2 percent—a significant increase compared to previous years but still small considering 
China is now the world’s second largest economy.22 Overseas FDI assets as a share of GDP were less than 
5 percent in China in 2009, compared to 6 percent for India, 10 percent in Brazil, and 26 percent in 
Russia.
While China opened itself up to FDI inflows from a relatively early stage and liberalized OFDI 
starting in the late 1990s, measures to liberalize portfolio flows have remained quite limited. China’s 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program, adopted in 2002, allows a limited number 
of foreign institutional investors to invest in a specified range of Chinese domestic financial assets. The 
program sets quotas on inbound portfolio investment for each participating foreign institution as well 
as a quota on the overall size of the QFII program. To encourage long-term investments in the capital 
markets and discourage sudden capital outflows, (SAFE) initially permitted QFIIs to offer only closed-end 
funds and subjected their investments to a three-year lock-up period before the full amount placed could 
be withdrawn and repatriated. Since then SAFE has permitted QFIIs to offer open-end funds and has 11
significantly relaxed restrictions on repatriation. But the authorities continue to attempt to influence the 
composition of capital flows by imposing higher minimum capital requirements on banks and securities 
companies than on mutual funds and insurance companies. 
The QFII scheme was small at its inception and has been allowed to expand only marginally. As of 
December 2010 the authorities had licensed 97 foreign institutions to participate in the program. The 
authorities raised the global ceiling from $10 billion when the program began to $30 billion at the end  
of 2007 and increased the maximum initial investment amount for each new institutional investor from 
$800 million to $1 billion in August 2008. But the program is still small in scale. Approved investment 
funds accumulated stood at $19.72 billion as of December 2010, just 0.5 percent of China’s A-share 
market capitalization. By keeping fund quotas low, the authorities have limited the ability of foreign 
financial institutions to play a significant role in the domestic markets and hindered capital market 
development. 
China’s Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) program, introduced in 2006, allows 
domestic financial institutions to invest abroad using a structure similar to that of QFIIs. While the 
authorities initially limited QDII investments to fixed-income instruments, they added equities to the 
permitted mix in 2007, allowing the QDII program to expand rapidly in size and scope. Early quota 
demand was driven by the desire of domestic investors to diversify away from domestic markets and take 
advantage of expected high returns abroad. Most QDII investments are concentrated in instruments 
traded on the Hong Kong exchange but agreements between Chinese financial supervisory authorities and 
counterparts in other countries suggest that the authorities may allow investments in other markets in the 
future.
Retail investor interest in QDII funds declined dramatically in response to the global economic 
crisis after nearly two years of steady quota expansion. In the 17 months to end-September 2009, the 
number of QDII licensed institutions and total approved investment funds accumulated remained 
fixed at 56 and $50.7 billion, respectively.23 Demand for quotas was so weak during this period that, by 
end-August 2009, domestic investors had invested only half their total approved funds abroad, prompting 
SAFE to warn that it would reduce quotas for QDII investors that did not make full use of them.24 
However, once global markets recovered and fears of capital outflows subsided, SAFE quickly resumed its 
quota approvals. Improved foreign market expectations and growing concerns over domestic overheating 
and Shanghai A-share market volatility have led to renewed interest in QDII quotas. By December 2010, 
the number of QDII licensed institutions had increased to 88 and total approved investment funds grew 
to $68.4 billion. 
Nevertheless, the relatively small size of the QDII program means that it cannot provide households 
with a significant means to diversify their savings and enjoy portfolio income in excess of what they earn 12
from low-yielding bank deposits. The total approved QDII investment quota as a share of total  
Chinese household savings deposits has yet to rise above its 2007 peak of 2.1 percent. This share was only 
1.5 percent at the end of the first half of 2010. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, QDIIs do not always 
exhaust their approved investment quotas. 
Other channels for outbound capital flows include cross-border lending by China’s banks and 
sovereign wealth fund investments. Policy banks do the bulk of China’s external lending, often to secure 
commodities abroad or to support the outward investments of state-owned enterprises. However, these 
banks have engaged in a wider variety of international lending recently, including concessionary multi-
billion dollar loan agreements with developing countries for local energy and infrastructure projects. 
China Investment Corporation (CIC) has continued to increase its outward investment despite the losses 
it incurred as a result of the financial crisis. According to one estimate, it invested $58 billion abroad in 
2009, increasing its total overseas holdings to about $100 billion.25 
Finally China’s effort to promote the internationalization of the renminbi could ultimately 
facilitate the transition to capital account convertibility. China launched this initiative in 2004 when it 
allowed Hong Kong residents to open renminbi deposit accounts in Hong Kong banks. The effort to 
internationalize the use of the renminbi was further boosted in July 2009 when China introduced cross-
border trade settlement in renminbi. Initially this program ran as a pilot. It was restricted to trade between 
five Chinese cities and Hong Kong, Macao, and ASEAN countries and was open to all Chinese importers 
but only a small number of exporting firms. In 2010 the program was widened in two steps. First, in June 
2010 the program was expanded to include trade transactions between Chinese firms in 20 provinces and 
cities and the rest of the world. Second, in December the authorities substantially expanded the number 
of Chinese exporting companies able to participate in cross-border trade settlement in renminbi.26 As a 
result, the volume of renminbi trade settlement expanded from RMB3.6 billion (US$0.5 billion) in the 
second half of 2009 to RMB66.7 billion (US$9.8 billion) in the first half of 2010 and then RMB126.5 
billion (US$18.7 billion) in the third quarter. However, even in the third quarter only about 2 percent of 
China’s international trade transactions were settled in renminbi. The vast majority of transactions are still 
settled in US dollars.
Because the cross-border renminbi trade settlement continues to be predominantly settlement of 
Chinese import transactions, the program has led to a substantial build up of renminbi deposits in Hong 
Kong. By July 2010 renminbi deposits in Hong Kong banks totaled RMB103.7 billion or 1.8 percent of 
total bank deposits (Subacchi 2010, 9). Deposits continued to build rapidly and by end-October stood at 
RMB217 billion or twice the mid-year amount. 
This build up has been possible only because of reforms in the ways that renminbi deposits can 
be utilized. Initially Hong Kong banks accepting renminbi deposits had little alternative to deposit the 
funds with the Bank of China (Hong Kong), which serves as the clearing bank. But Bank of China pays 13
only 0.865 percent interest on these renminbi deposits. Thus Hong Kong banks were not able to offer 
attractive interest rates to individuals and firms depositing renminbi funds. To make the holding of 
renminbi deposits more attractive the Chinese authorities have taken several important steps.
First, since 2007 the mainland authorities have gradually approved an expanded issuance of 
renminbi-denominated bonds in Hong Kong. Initially issuance was limited to the Ministry of Finance 
and domestic Chinese financial institutions. But in 2010 foreign companies were authorized to issue 
renminbi-denominated bonds in Hong Kong. Increasing the availability of higher yielding renminbi-
denominated financial assets is critical to increasing the international use of the renminbi.
Second since August the mainland authorities have granted Hong Kong banks involved in renminbi 
cross-border trade settlement access to the on-shore interbank bond market. Thus, these banks can now 
invest their renminbi funds in bonds issued in China and traded on the interbank bond market. This 
allows these banks to purchase higher-yielding renminbi denominated financial assets rather than holding 
low-yielding deposits with the clearing bank. This, in turn, allows them to offer higher rates on renminbi 
deposits, making Hong Kong exporters more willing to settle their transactions with their mainland 
Chinese clients in renminbi. 
In the short run it is not clear whether China gains in pure economic terms from this increased 
internationalization of the renminbi. As already noted renminbi settlement has been dominated by 
Chinese importers, rather than exporters. This means increased off-shore holdings of renminbi, which at 
the margin increases rather than decreases the pressure for renminbi appreciation in the onshore foreign 
exchange market. It is sometimes argued denominating and settling trade contracts in renminbi allows 
Chinese firms to escape foreign exchange risk without assuming any hedging costs. This seems unlikely 
because in a competitive market if foreign firms were required to assume these costs that they would 
adjust their prices appropriately rather than accepting reduced profits.
The more uncertain question is whether internationalization will ultimately help pave the way for 
capital account convertibility. Since historically substantial capital account convertibility has preceded 
the international use of currencies, we are to some extent in uncharted territory. To date the source of 
all off-shore renminbi deposits in Hong Kong derives from current account transactions, for example 
renminbi earnings from exporting to China or Chinese tourism. Whether or not foreign investors will 
be happy to hold increasingly significant amounts of renminbi deposits offshore while China’s capital 
account remains largely closed will determine the success of the internationalization strategy, as currently 
pursued by the Chinese authorities.
Policy recommendAtions
China has made some progress in relaxing capital controls over the past three decades. The authorities 
aggressively liberalized inbound foreign direct investment from the outset of the reform process and 14
have substantially liberalized outbound foreign direct investment over the past decade. Nonetheless most 
empirical studies measuring the degree to which China’s capital account has been liberalized find that 
China’s controls remain highly restrictive even in comparison with other emerging markets such as Brazil 
and Russia (Chinn and Ito 2008; Ito and Chinn 2010). Moreover, substantial obstacles still impede 
significant further capital account liberalization, particularly the liberalization of cross-border flows of 
portfolio capital. 
China faces significant challenges in moving toward a substantially more liberalized capital account. 
First is the state of the domestic banking system. The banking system has been strengthened substantially 
over the past decade, but its strong recent financial performance may owe as much to the central bank’s 
interest rate controls as to the improved ability of banks to price risk appropriately. As Xiao Gang 
has acknowledged, “Growing big is the best way for Chinese banks to make more money under the 
current financial environment. This model of growth, however, neither assures the long-term sustainable 
development of the banking sector nor satisfies the need of a balanced economic and social structure.” 
Gradual relaxation of remaining interest rate controls, particularly the ceilings on rates for deposits of 
various maturities, is an essential precondition to the emergence of a robust, fully commercially-oriented 
banking system. This goal was embraced by China’s premier in early 2009 and reiterated by the Central 
Committee in its Twelfth Five-Year Program approved in October 2010. Hopefully progress will soon be 
visible on this front. 
Second, parts of China’s financial system are woefully underdeveloped. While the authorities have 
made substantial progress in the development of the foreign exchange forward and swap transactions 
markets, China’s local market for non-financial corporate debt remains tiny, only 3 percent of GDP.
Third, China’s exchange rate remains significantly undervalued. Consequently, substantially 
liberalizing the capital account before the value of the renminbi is closer to an underlying equilibrium 
level would likely generate large-scale speculative capital inflows based on the expectation of a large 
renminbi appreciation. These inflows could undermine the ability of the central bank to maintain price 
stability. Thus allowing gradual appreciation of the currency and greater exchange rate flexibility is also an 
essential precondition to moving toward further liberalization of the capital account.
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